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PUBLICITY IN THE JUVENILE COURT
With few exceptions, 1 a public trial is granted, under the sixth amendment, to adults accused of crimes.2 Correspondingly, what takes place
in the courtroom is generally held to be public property available for
dissemination by the press.' In juvenile proceedings, however, privacy

has "typically been among the few unchallenged keynotes." I Characteristic of the juvenile court system have been procedures aimed at
maintaining the anonymity of juvenile offenders.5
In a recent case, a newspaper has chosen to assail the heretofore undisputed sanctity of privacy in the juvenile court. In In re Ithaca
Journal News, Inc.,6 a reporter from defendant newspaper, present at
a hearing involving two youths apprehended for theft, was ordered by
7
the City Judge to withhold from publication the names of the boys.

The boys were nevertheless identified by the newspaper and contempt

proceedings followed. The court, in balancing the freedom of the
press against "the right of an infant to be spared from the life long
devastating effects of publicity," 8 found the newspaper guilty of contempt.
The Ithaca decision upholds the constitutionality of statutes designed
1 See note 21 infra.
2 U.S. CONST.

amend. VI; Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 RocKY

MT. L. Rxv. 101, 102 (1958). See, e.g., Note, Criminal Law-Public Trial-Waiver, 36
ORE. L. REv. 345 (1957).
3 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947). The press, however, cannot interfere

with the right of the accused to a fair trial. See generally Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384
U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941).
4 Geis, supra note 2, at 102. See generally Paulsen, Fairness to the juvenile Offender,
41 MINN. L. REv. 547, 560 (1957); Note, Rights and Rebabilitation in the JuvenileCourts, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 281, 285 (1967); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State
Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REv. 775, 794 (1966).
5 See notes 16-19 infra.
6 292 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Ithaca City Ct. 1968).
7 The court was acting under state statute, N.Y. CODE OF CR. PROC. S 913-f (McKinney
1958), which reads, in part:
The court on its own motion may, but only as to the public, order the indictment or information sealed in the case of a youth charged with a crime.
On appeal, the city court's decision was held to be outside the scope of the New
York statute, since the newspaper's identification of the boys was based on information
obtained prior to the sealing off of the information by the court. 294 N.Y.S.2d 559
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968).
8 292 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
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to protect juvenile offenders from newspaper notoriety. Such statutes
are not uncommon. In 1961, it was reported that thirty of the states,
in lieu of directly forbidding publication of juvenile court proceedings,
left it to the discretion of the court to forbid such publication.9 Thirteen of the states had no law by which such publication could be prohibited- 0 five states directly forbade publication," while Georgia and
Montana took a unique position.' 2 The Standard Juvenile Court Act
also denies publication of the juvenile's name or picture except with
the authorization of the juvenile court.13 Unquestionably, the state
legislatures are aware of the need to protect the juvenile from this type
of publicity.
The publicity question of Ithacaemphasizes merely one area in which
14
juveniles accused of crimes are afforded special treatment by the law.
With an eye toward effecting its primary goal of rehabilitation, 15 numerous special procedures, all designed to eliminate stigma by maintaining
the anonymity of the youthful offender in his contact with the police
and the courts, have been incorporated into the juvenile court system.
9
Geis, Publication of the Names of Juvenile Felons, 23 MONT. L. REv. 141, 145
(1962). Virginia's statute is in the majority. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-162 (1960). It
provides in part:
The general public shall be excluded from all juvenile court hearings and only
such persons admitted as the judge shall deem proper. [T~he records of all such
cases . .. shall be withheld from public inspection ....
A 1958 amendment to the statute added:
[Iun cases involving criminal offenses by juveniles, the judge may make public
the name of the offender ... if he deems it to be in the public interest.
10 Geis, supranote 9, at 145.
11 Id.
12 The Georgia statute makes mandatory the release of the names of second offenders.
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2452 (1968). The Montana statute allows for publication where
the juvenile is charged with a felony. REv. CODE MONT. § 10-633 (1967). The passing
of the Montana statute provoked Geis's article in which the California sociologist
condemns such laws. Geis, supra note 9.
13 STANDARD JUvENL CouRT Aar § 33d, comment (1959), quoted in Geis, supra note
9, at 148.
14A separate court system for juveniles was first developed in the United States in
1899. Founded on the philosophy that the "welfare of the child is of paramount concern," (1959 Report of the Comm. to the Gov. of Va., Problems of the Juvenile Offender, House Doc. No. 4, at 16), it invoked the doctrine of parens atriae which
was "to accord the judge the greatest possible opportunity to exercise a quasi-parental
influence over the child." Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67
Colum. L. Rev. 281 (1967).
15 See, e.g., Note, Rights and Rehabilitationin the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLum. L. REv.

281 (1967). See also WnFE.LR & Co rrarz, JuvENiLE DEUNQuENcY-ITs PRiVENmION
AND) CONTROL, (Russell Sage Foundation, 1965).
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Included are (1) the elimination of arrest by warrant and the use of
indictment as well as other such forms of criminal procedure, 6 (2) the
use of a special courtroom with informal proceedings, 7 (3) the keeping of separate records with the possibility of their later expungement, s
and (4) restrictions on the direct reporting of events during the proceedings. 19
There was little difficulty in gaining court approval of the constitutionality of juvenile court procedure, but the early cases establishing the constitutionality of juvenile courts were not concerned with
the publicity issue. 20 Specific conditions in criminal cases had already
warranted the courts' approval of private hearings 21 and it was unlikely
that an attack on the juvenile courts on such grounds would be successful.22 Later cases, dealing with the non-public character of the
juvenile courts, have sustained their comparative secrecy. 23 Although
the Gault decision 24 modernized the constitutionality of the juvenile
courts, it should nevertheless have a negligible effect on the publicity
25
issue.
16 Geis, supra note 2, at 105.
17 See, e.g., id.

'8 See, e.g., Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and
Adult Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U. L. Q. 147; Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARv. L. REv. 775,
784, 799-801 (1966). This note represents an excellent and concise analysis of the expungement problem. The purpose of alleviating stigma is acknowledged and especially
pointed out is the inadequacy of those statutes, too few in number, which now deal
with the problem. See. e.g., note 25 infra.
19 See Geis, supra note 2; Geis, supra note 9.
2
9See Pugh v. Bowden, 54 Fla. 302, 45 So. 499 (1907); In re Sharp, 15 Idaho 120, 96
P. 563 (1908); Ex parte Loving, 178 Mo. 194, 77 S.W. 508 (1903); Commonwealth v.
Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198 (1905); Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, 88 P. 609 (1907).
"Innumerable cases have come before the court subsequent to these, but they represent
little more than restatements of the original situation and, with infrequent exceptions, the
higher courts, relying upon these initial cases for support, have reached the same conclusions." Geis, supra note 2, at 107.
21 "Grand jury hearings are traditionally private, and the press is regularly excluded
in some jurisdictions from attending or reporting upon trials dealing with treasonable
or particularly obscene material." Geis, supra note 9, at 144.
22 Geis, supra note 2, at 110.
23See, e.g., State v. Guerrero, 120 Ariz. 421, 120 P. 2d 798, 802 (1942); Dendy v.
Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269, 274 (1944).
24
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
25 Not only does Gault not denigrate privacy in the juvenile court, it is clear from
the majority opinion that the Court, in fact, would favor more encompassing and more
effective controls on publicity with respect to juvenile contact with the police and the
courts. The Court states:
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The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press, while not absolute, should not be haphazardly infringed upon. There is a basic
presumption of an "unfettered press" and any abridgement of this right
must be supported by "contravening and overriding principles." 26
Accepting (1) the constitutionality of the juvenile court system, (2)
that rehabilitation is the primary objective of that system, and (3) that
the "goals of protecting a young person from the misconduct of his
youth and of informing the community of how its courts operate in
every case, cannot be pursued simultaneously," 27 the principal question
becomes one of determining the extent to which privacy is a positive
factor in furthering the rehabilitation of the child. Is the extent great
enough to constitute an "overriding principle?"
Recognition of the harmful effects of publicity is indeed well documented. 28 A child marked as a delinquent is precluded from achieving
in his community the stature he deserves as a rehabilitated individual.
Before having reached the age of complete discretion,2 9 he has acquired

a police "record" which will jeopardize his career opportunities. The
problems which resultingly beset him when he begins to seek a job
severely hamper his rehabilitation.30 The feeling of self-respect, neces[Tihe commendable principles relating to the processing and treatment of
juveniles separately from adults are in no way involved or affected by the pr&
cedural issues under discussion. 387 U.S. at 22.
Recognition is given by the Court in Gault to the need to curtail publicity in the
juvenile court. The opinion points out that "the claim of secrecy however is more
rhetoric than reality." 387 U.S. at 22. It points out that the courts, and the police
departments, which do not come within the language of most statutes, routinely provide
information to the F.B.I, military, government agencies and even private employers.
The Court then concludes, on the issue of publicity:
[Tihere is no reason why . . . a state cannot continue, if it deems it appropriate, to provide and to improve provisions for the confidentiality of records
of police contacts and court action relating to juveniles. 387 U.S. at 24.
26 Geis, supra note 2, at 107.
27
Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 Mii'N. L. REv. 547, 560 (1957).
28
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22-24 (1967); STANDAR JuvENiLE CouRt Aer § 33d,
comment (1959); WHELER & CornTTR ., JuvwNu DELINQuENCY-Irs PPEWvNToN AND
CoNTRor, (Russell Sage Foundation, 1965); PRnSIDENr's COMMissioN oN LAW ENFoRCEAiEN'T AND ADMINIMSraOION OF JusTicE, TAsK FoRcE REPoRT, JuvENILE DELiNQuENcY AND

Yorm Ci E, 38, 92 (1967); Geis, Publication of the Names of Juvenile Felons, 23
MoNT. L. REv. 141 (1962); Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 RocKY
Mr. L. REv. 101 (1958); Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 Miirt. L. REv.
547, 560 (1957); Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 281 (1967); Note, juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized justice, 79 HARv. L. REv. 775, 784 (1966).
29 Geis, supra note 2, at 102.
3
0Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice,
79 HAnv. L. REv. 775, 784 (1966).
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sary in effecting rehabilitation, is impaired by notoriety which humiliates and demoralizes, leaving the juvenile "heavily charged with feelings of guilt, anxiety, and recrimination." 3It has been suggested that publicity acts often as a deterrent,3 2 however
the better view seems to be that not only does it fail to deter, but it is
often a causative factor in reoccurrences as well as original instances
of delinquency.3 3 Evidence has shown that some juveniles are proud
of the public attention their acts attract and publicity thus becomes the
end which they seek.3 4 Aside from the "deterrent" argument, the
primary argument of the newspapers is that the public has a right to
know what is happening. 3 It does not seem that the goals of anonymity
and of keeping the public informed of the incidence of crime among
juveniles are necessarily incompatible. The fact that an event took
place can be announced without identification of the participants in
the event.3 6
Most newspapers agree that the goal of anonymity is a worthy one,37
but they feel that the best method of controlling publication is news31 STANDARD JUVENILE COURT AcT S 33d, comment (1959), quoted in Gels, supra note
9, at 148.
32
AM. NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS Assoc., SPECIAL COMVt. ON FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL,
FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL 5 (1967); Interview with D. Tennant Bryan, Publisher, Richmond Times-Dispatch and Richmond News Leader, in Richmond, Oct. 24, 1968; Interview with John Leard, Executive Editor, Richmond Times-Dispatch, and Richmond
News Leader, in Richmond, Oct. 24, 1968.
33 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28, at 38, quoting SALISBURY, SHOOK-UP GENERATION
164 (1958).
34 See, e.g., Geis, supra note 2, at 124; Interview with Judge Max 0. Laster, Richmond, Oct. 22, 1968; Interview with Judge Kermit V. Rooke, Richmond, Oct. 22,
1968. Indeed, it is pointed out that "in the most intractable cases (when presumably
publicity would be used) publicity feeds the drives that move these youths and may
influence others toward emulation." TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28.
35 See, e.g., AM. NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS Assoc., supra note 32, at 1; Interview with
D. Tennant Bryan, supra note 32. But see J. Edgar Hoover's statement that "citizens
have a right to know the identities of the potential threats to public order within their
communities," in'answer to which the statement is made that "[it is fatuous . . . to
suggest that a typical youth before the juvenile court poses a threat to community
order." Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the juvenile Courts, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 281,
286 (1967).
36 When asked about this approach to the reporting of juvenile court proceedings, a
newspaper official commented to the effect that nobody would want to read anything so
dull. Such an attitude on the part of the newspapers reenforces the conclusion, infra
p. 353, that the press, driven by a profit motive, should not be allowed to exercise selfrestraint in the reporting of juvenile court proceedings.
37 See, e.g., Am. NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS Assoc., supra note 30, Appendix "C", which sets
out the policies of various state newspaper associations.
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paper self-restraint88 The feeling has been expressed that newspapers
possess the qualifications, and are entitled, to determine what subject
matter should be printed with regard to juvenile offenders.8 9 In some
states, even where statutes vest this discretion in the court, the effect
in practice is often one of the press ultimately deciding for themselves
anyhow. 40 Indeed, this situation may exist where, even though restrictions from the court are forthcoming, access to police files and information leaks at the police station, where the presence of reporters is commonplace, often lead to newspaper obtainment of desired information.41
In summary, it can briefly be said that the theory behind the Ithaca decision leads to a proper and desirable result in dealing with the question of
publicity in the juvenile court. The following conclusions may be made:
(1) Any infringement upon freedom of the press will likely be met
with protest from the news media regardless of the beneficial effects of
such encroachment. Arguments mustered by the newspapers must
give way to the greater social value derived from juvenile rehabilitation.
(2) Discretion in deciding what to print should rest with the judge
whose first interest is in rehabilitating the juvenile and whose experience
and access to expert information enable him to better exercise that discretion. Newspapers, in spite of an attitude of fairness, are driven by
a profit motive and should not be relied upon to exercise proper selfrestraint in every situation.
(3) Present laws designed to protect the juvenile from publicity
and assist his rehabilitation are rendered ineffective if newspapers are
able to gain information from sources outside the court. Where now
only informal understanding may exist between the court per se and
the police station as to what information should be released, strict guidelines should be established to insure more effective protection of the
juvenile offender.
(4) Proper sanctions should be available to the court to enable it
to uphold its limitations on disclosure.
H. E. S., Jr.
38Interview with D. Tennant Bryan, supra note 32. See generally Am. NEWSpAPM.
PULsHERs Assoc., supranote 32.
3
9 nt~rview with D. Tennant Bryan, supra note 32.
40
See TAsK FORCE REPORT, supra note 28; Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in theJuvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 281, 286, citing Geis, supra note 9, at 145.
41 Interview with John Leard, supra note 32.

